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There is perhaps no principle in sentencing more familiar than boosting
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punishment for defendants who have been convicted before. But as
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widespread as this practice is, it has recently become quite controversial.
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In my remarks, I’ll highlight two concerns: first, that repeat-offender
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penalties are not well designed to accomplish their intended goals, and
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second, that the procedures for imposing some of these sentences are

an abridgment of that

unconstitutional. Let us start with the history of efforts to identify prior
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offenders—a history relevant to each of these two issues.

version appears in the
spring 2014 issue of the
Marquette Law Review.

I. Repeat-Offender Punishment:

A Look Backward
Punishing the Marked Offender—Colonial Times Through 1830

S

tatutes mandating stiffer sentences for repeat offenders have been with us since
before the nation was formed. But in early America, courts had no photographs,
fingerprints, or DNA to determine if a person who claimed to be a first offender
was lying. So they used the same cheap identification method used in Europe for
centuries—marking or branding the body of the person convicted.
Felonies during this period were generally punishable by death, but even until the
late 1820s and early 1830s, a defendant convicted for the first time could seek from the
judge “benefit of clergy,” essentially a reprieve from execution, and be branded on the
palm or cheek instead. For example, in 1801, future president Andrew Jackson, sitting
as a judge in Tennessee, granted benefit of clergy to a fellow convicted of delivering a
“mortal bruise” to a man’s head with an oak plank. According to the court records, the
defendant was immediately “burned in the left hand with the letter M,” marking him as
ineligible for this leniency again. Marking bodies was also common for non-capital
crimes. For example, first offenders convicted of some crimes lost one ear; second
offenders lost the other. Punishments such as these were replaced by terms of
incarceration only gradually, between the late 1790s and the 1830s, as each state
built its very first prison.

Illustrations by Phil Foster
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Discovering the Recidivist—Penitentiaries
and the Deviant Type—1820 –1880
These new penitentiaries ushered in a new
punishment: lengthy terms of incarceration. For
repeat offenders, these terms could increase with each
additional lesson unheeded. When its prison was built
in 1817, Massachusetts, for example, imposed an extra
seven years on every second offender, and life in prison
for every third offender.
The building of each state’s penitentiary also
offered new hope for identifying prior offenders.
Prison records noted marks, scars, and tattoos, along
with names. And there was—for the first time—just
one set of records for all convicts in the state. But the
records being organized by name, it was impossible
to search by scar or missing digit. As de Tocqueville
explained after visiting American prisons: “[T]he
courts condemn, almost always, without knowing
the true name of the criminal, and still less his
previous life.”

28

Legislatures recognized this too, and a few changed
their laws to address it. The established common law
rule followed in every state at the end of the 18th
century required that whenever a statute specified a
more severe sentence for a repeat offender, the prior
conviction had to be alleged in the indictment and
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. After
several years’ experience with its new penitentiary,
Massachusetts passed a new statute that required the
warden to notify the state’s attorney when he recognized
a prior offender, and the state’s attorney to charge the
prisoner as a repeat offender in a supplemental charging
document called an information. The prisoner would
then be brought from prison back to court, where, if his
past conviction was proven to a new jury or admitted,
he would be sentenced to the longer term. But this
innovation was not followed in most states.
Even as our Civil War ended, courts still had no
practical, reliable way to identify a person as one who
before conviction had been convicted previously.
By 1930, everything had changed.
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Photography was first. The first “rogues’ gallery” was
displayed at the New York Police Department in 1858,
and by the 1880s police departments all over the world
had mug-shot collections. But there was no efficient
way to search hundreds of photographs. This problem
was solved by a revolutionary identification system
using an index of eleven bodily measurements. Indexing
by measurement, not by name, the Bertillon system
identified a prisoner in minutes. It won over the wardens
in New York and Illinois, who mandated measurements
for all inmates by the 1890s. Prisons and police
departments in other states followed suit. Fingerprinting
was not far behind. It was first used in criminal cases
for women, as Bertillon operators found it awkward to
measure the body parts of prostitutes. By 1920 it had
been extended to men, and the NYPD’s fingerprint index
had grown to 400,000 sets of prints.

Trusting Science—Parole for Some, Incapacitation for the Dangerous—1930 –1970
These new, reliable means of identifying past
offenders reinforced the belief that crime was committed
by a small group of physically inferior deviants born
with moral deficiencies. “Instinctive criminals,” argued
one expert, could be identified by their “ill-shaped heads”;
“asymmetrical faces”; “deformed, . . . ill-developed bodies”;
“abnormal conditions of the genital organs”; “large, heavy
jaws”; “outstanding ears”; and “a restless, animal-like,
or brutal expression.” Many thought repeat offenders
should be segregated from society, like the insane. Six
states authorized involuntary sterilization of habitual
criminals, a practice that the Supreme Court did not stop
until 1942. Confident that judges now could reliably

ONCE A CRIMINAL . . . ?

Technology to the Rescue—Photos,
Bertillonage, and Fingerprints—1880 –1930

sort less-dangerous first offenders from more-dangerous
hardened criminals, legislatures in the 1920s and 1930s
adopted both more-severe recidivist penalties and morelenient probation and parole. By 1949, 43 of the 48 states
had habitual felony offender statutes; more than half
permitted or mandated life in prison for third or fourth
offenders.

Punitive Turn—Three Strikes and Other
Mandatory Sentencing Laws—1970 On
Two decades later, when legislators decided to
rein in the discretion of judges and parole authorities,
new sentencing guidelines keyed sentences to criminal
history and quantified its effect on punishment. In
states that retained discretionary parole release, parole
eligibility was denied or delayed for repeat offenders.
And by 1996, 24 states and the federal government
had passed even tougher “two-,” “three-,” and “fourstrikes and you’re out” laws, some requiring life
without parole.
The effects of these repeat-offender premiums
have varied by state. In Washington State as of last
year, nearly 70 percent of the 637 prisoners serving
life-without-parole sentences were sentenced under
the state’s three-strikes laws. In California, where a
second strike carries a doubled sentence and the third
strike carries 25 to life, the effect was huge: maximum
sentences statewide grew 6 percent longer, and the
odds of a prison sentence rose nearly 23 percent. As of
2009, one of every four California prisoners was serving
a second- or third-strike sentence, and, of these, most—
55 percent—were convicted of a nonviolent offense.
With this background, let’s turn to two of the
challenges that repeat-offender penalties pose for courts
and legislatures.

“These new, reliable means of identifying past offenders
reinforced the belief that crime was committed by a small group
of physically inferior deviants born with moral deficiencies.”
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II. Justifying Repeat-Offender Penalties:

F

irst, stiffer penalties for prior offenders—as
applied—too often fail to advance the reasons
that they were adopted. Let’s consider the
reasons and the reality.

Deterrence—Weak Effects
Recent research has found that increased sentences
for repeat offenders do not appear to be very effective
deterrents to future crime. Here’s the nutshell version of
what you can find in the sources in the literature: Threestrike statutes have had little detectable impact on crime
in some states, such as California, and in others they are
linked to only a small decrease in robbery and property
offenses. As for deterring the sentenced offender himself
from future crime, recent research suggests that the
longer periods of incarceration appear to have “either
no effect or undesirable effects” on rates of offending
after release.

Incapacitating the Dangerous—
Predicting Risk from Criminal History
A second, more commonly voiced rationale for
recidivist penalties is the incapacitation of those most
likely to commit future crime. The newest trend in
sentencing is to use risk assessment and “evidencebased” predictions of reoffending to determine
what sentence to impose. Lawmakers hope that risk
assessment will help them trim prison populations
while still getting the most bang for their criminal justice
buck; judges like it because it makes sentencing seem
more objective. In Virginia, risk scores determine who
is eligible for alternative punishment. Missouri judges
rely on an automated recommendation reporting the
offender’s risk score and predicted recidivism after two
years for other offenders in his specific risk category.
Here in Wisconsin, a number of counties have been
using risk measures for several years, as part of the AIM
(Assess, Inform, and Measure) Pilot Project.
The explosion of research and commentary affords
an indication of how controversial this is. The Federal
Sentencing Reporter, edited by Marquette’s own
Professor Michael O’Hear, recently devoted an entire
issue to it. Risk also triggered a major debate in the
American Law Institute, ending in a provision of the new
Model Penal Code–Sentencing, endorsing its limited use.

30

Many understandably object to the use of risk
prediction in sentencing as unfair: it punishes a
defendant just because he has the same characteristics as
other people who were reincarcerated after release, and
it deprives him of liberty for what he might do rather
than what he actually did. Others are concerned that
reliance upon factors other than prior criminal history,
such as gender or age, violates the Equal Protection
Clause. But a growing chorus is warning that even
the use of criminal history to predict recidivism risk is
unjustified and unwise.
I’ll summarize some of
these criticisms briefly.
1. Risk prediction as
applied at sentencing—
questionable reliability.
First, even though the
best risk-prediction
instruments (an
instrument here
means essentially a
questionnaire or list of
weighted factors) can
correctly predict the
risk class of an offender
Nancy J. King
as often as 7 out of 10
times, sentencing based
on criminal history as practiced is not risk assessment at
its best. Here are just a few of the problems:
Much of the research supporting reliability of risk
assessment has tested instruments used to predict
recidivism by parolees. These instruments include
“dynamic” factors that change after sentencing, as well as
variables such as age, companions, marital status, gender,
social achievement, or psychological health. When risk
is predicted based on prior criminal history alone, all of
these factors are ignored, increasing the number of cases
in which the prediction is wrong.
Also, although research confirms that recidivism rates
do increase as the number of prior convictions increases
beyond three or four, the relationship between a single
prior conviction and future crime is tenuous at best.
For example, two years after release from their first
conviction, offenders over age 41 are no more likely

Photo: Sandy Campbell

A Mismatch Between Theory and Practice
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to commit a crime than people with clean records; for
those between 37 and 41, the rates converge after five
years. So maybe the old adage referred to in the title
of this talk might make sense if it were “Four times
a criminal recently, probably a criminal later,” but to
assume that a single criminal conviction dooms a person
to a life of crime may be no more accurate than centuryold predictions of future violence based on jaw size.
Finally, repeat-offender laws and criminal history
scores usually don’t track the measures of past offending
that research links to recidivism. Juvenile history is often
included, despite research showing most people desist
from crime after late adolescence. The recency of a prior
conviction dramatically affects its predictive capacity,
depending upon the age of an offender, but most
criminal history provisions do not vary with the age
of the defendant, and many impose no limit on the
age of prior convictions. The type of prior crime also
matters—property offenses, for example, are much more
likely to be repeated than other offenses. But sentencing
laws and guidelines often do not distinguish between
crime types.
2. Costs of increasing sentences based on predictions
from criminal history—exacerbating racial bias.
A second problem with basing the need for
incapacitation on prior record is that even if it does
improve predictions somewhat, any resulting marginal,
and possibly temporary, reduction in crime might not
be worth its costs. Reliance on criminal history
exacerbates past racial bias in investigation, arrest,
charging, bargaining, and sentencing. Bernard
E. Harcourt in his book, Against Prediction: Profiling,
Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, calls this
the “ratchet effect,” and condemns risk prediction at all
phases of the criminal justice process for this reason.
Today, nearly one in three adults in this country has a
criminal history record, and as of 2007, the percentage
of blacks under correctional control was more than four
times that of whites. Since California adopted its threestrikes law, black defendants have received significantly

longer prison sentences than whites and Latinos.
A recent study found that two-thirds of racial differences
in imprisonment rates in Minnesota resulted from the
weighting of criminal history factors in sentencing.
Just a few months ago, U.S Attorney General Eric Holder
ordered federal prosecutors to consider ignoring
recidivism provisions, stating, “In some cases . . .
recidivist enhancement statutes have resulted in unduly
harsh sentences and perceived or actual disparities that
do not reflect our Principles of Federal Prosecution.” This
problem is so pronounced that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission recently warned employers
that using criminal history data in hiring decisions could
expose them to disparate impact lawsuits.

Just Deserts in Proportion to Blame—
A Mismatch with Repeat-Offender
Penalties
For these reasons and many more, some retributivists
are calling for a ban on the consideration of criminal
history in setting sentences. Others committed to “just
deserts” sentencing philosophy have argued that repeat
offenders are actually more blameworthy than first
offenders, because they are more defiant, or because
they had already learned that their behavior was
wrong. The problem is, current laws don’t advance
either theory. Repeat-offender premiums are imposed
on negligent, impulsive, and reckless action as well as
knowing behavior, and they often punish defendants
who have “prior” convictions not because their latest
criminal acts were committed after a previous sentence,
but only because prosecutors decided to prosecute
multiple counts arising out of the same criminal episode
sequentially. And in most jurisdictions, most defendants
eligible for recidivist premiums end up bargaining for
something less.
In sum, legislatures, sentencing commissions,
and courts are not doing a very good job of aligning
punishments for repeat offenders with either theory
or research.

“Recent research has found that increased
sentences for repeat offenders do not appear to be
very effective deterrents to future crime.”
Marquette Lawyer
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III. The Process:

A Changing Constitutional Landscape

A

separate concern is that the process for imposing
these penalties may violate the Constitution.
This controversy started just over 13 years ago
but has heated up in the past few months.

Apprendi, Alleyne, and the Exception
for Prior Convictions
In the summer of 2000, the Supreme Court in
Apprendi v. New Jersey held that a fact that increases the
maximum penalty a defendant faces is an element of a
crime, and a defendant has a right to have a jury find
that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Allowing a judge
to determine merely that such a fact is probably true
violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury finding
of every element, said the Court. This past summer, in
Alleyne v. United States, the Court explained that this
rule applies to facts that increase the minimum sentence
range as well, and overruled a 2002 decision in which
it had said otherwise. This element status brings with it
at least three rights: the right to jury determination, by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and, at least in the
federal courts, inclusion in the indictment.
But in every one of its many decisions applying
Apprendi, the Court has carefully stepped around
statutes that raise punishment ranges for prior offenders.
It has done this by consistently including in each
declaration of the Apprendi rule an exemption for the
particular fact of prior conviction. Not one of these
cases has actually involved a recidivist penalty, so the
announced exception remains dicta. Most recently,
the Alleyne decision included a footnote explaining
that the Court declined to revisit the exception because
the parties had not contested it. But plenty of other
defendants are contesting it, and a majority of justices
may be ready to scrap it. Here’s why they should.

No Clear Historical Basis for Exception
First, the historical record, so crucial to the Court in
all of its Apprendi cases, does not support exempting
prior convictions from the Apprendi rule.
Let’s start with charging practice. Throughout the
19th century, courts followed the common law rule
requiring the initial charge to allege any prior offense
that increased punishment. Only a handful of states, such
as Massachusetts, Virginia, and West Virginia, opted to
permit the prosecution to allege the defendant’s repeat
offender status after conviction, if a defendant’s alias was
debunked upon arrival at prison. Eventually, in 1912 in
Graham v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court concluded
that this omission of the prior offense allegation from
the initial indictment was not a federal constitutional
problem, reiterating the rule (true still today) that
states need not use indictments at all. After Graham,
more states followed Massachusetts. But this limited
development—affecting no more than a handful of
states until 1912, and not followed in the federal courts
until after World War II—is nothing like the established
historical practices that have influenced the Court in
prior cases.
As for the right to have a jury decide prior-offense
status when that would raise the maximum sentence,
this was the law in virtually every jurisdiction from the
Revolutionary War past World War II. As late as 1946,
only Alabama and Kansas allowed a judge to make
this determination instead of a jury. Observers in other
jurisdictions reported more than one case in which
the jury, despite fingerprints and other “unmistakable
evidence” that a defendant was indeed a multiple
offender, “decided upon its oath that the prisoner was a
first offender,” choosing to nullify the habitual offender
law rather than apply it.

“Criminal history, if it will justify a longer prison
sentence, deserves the same pre-charge investigation
as other facts that may aggravate a crime.”
32
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“The Court was wrong to carve out this prior-conviction
exception in Apprendi, and it was wrong in Almendarez-Torres.”
Precedent—Why Almendarez-Torres and
Other Cases Do Not Support the Exception

P

recedent shouldn’t prop up this exception either.
The case of Almendarez-Torres v. United States
(1998) is considered the chief authority for the
prior-conviction exception, but any basis it once had is
no longer viable. The defendant in that case turned up
in a Texas jail, after he’d been deported following a
burglary conviction, and was charged with reentering
the United States illegally. His indictment did not say
whether he was being charged under subsection (a) of
the relevant statute—which stated that the maximum
sentence was two years—or subsection (b), which
provided for up to 20 years if reentry occurred after
a conviction for an aggravated felony. The defendant
pleaded guilty and admitted his prior burglary
conviction, but then argued at sentencing that because
his indictment had not alleged his prior conviction,
a fact that he argued was an element of the greater
offense defined in subsection (b), he faced at most two
years. The Supreme Court disagreed, and in a five-to-four
decision, it upheld his seven-year sentence. Congress
intended that the prior conviction triggering the 18-year
increase would be a sentencing factor that the judge
could find after conviction, the Court reasoned, not an
element of a greater, aggravated version of the reentry
offense. Two years later, when the Court announced in
Apprendi that legislatures cannot bypass the right to jury
trial by designating a fact that raises the maximum
sentence as a “sentencing factor” instead of an element, it
exempted the fact of prior conviction, citing its decision
in Almendarez-Torres, and the “prior-conviction exception”
to the Sixth Amendment rule in Apprendi was born.
The Court was wrong to carve out this priorconviction exception in Apprendi, and it was wrong in
Almendarez-Torres. Justice Stephen Breyer’s opinion
for the Court in Almendarez-Torres rested on Graham,
from 1912, and Oyler v. Boles (1962), which also rejected
claims that omitting a sentence-raising prior conviction
from the initial indictment violated due process. But both
of those cases construed the Constitution’s limitations
on states, not the scope of the indictment clause in the

34

Fifth Amendment, at stake in Almendarez-Torres, which
doesn’t even apply to state defendants. Moreover, both
cases were decided before the Court declared that state
defendants had a constitutional right to reasonable
notice of the charge and the right to a jury trial.
The other cases relied on by the Court in AlmendarezTorres either have been overruled since Apprendi (in
Ring v. Arizona in 2002 and Alleyne) or have nothing
to do with charging and proof requirements for prior
convictions. Several cases stated that a prior conviction
that increases a sentence is not an element, but those
cases involved claims that increasing a sentence because
of a prior conviction was unconstitutional because it was
improper punishment for the prior offense. In each, the
Court explained that the heightened punishment was
not punishment for the prior conviction but, instead,
“a stiffened penalty for the latest crime.” None of those
cases would be affected by abandoning the exception.

Policy—Managing Jury Prejudice
Nor should policy arguments keep the exception
alive. The justices have worried that if prior convictions
were to be presented to juries, defendants would suffer.
But prior convictions are already elements of other
crimes, such as felony firearm offenses. And courts have
managed any prejudice just fine by using stipulations to
limit what the jury hears about the prior conviction, by
bifurcating trials and adjudicating the prior-conviction
question only after the jury determines guilt on the other
elements, by allowing the defendant to waive the jury for
the prior-conviction element alone, or by allowing the
defendant to admit that particular element, something
like a partial plea of guilty. And they’ve been doing this
for nearly 200 years, ever since Connecticut first chose to
adopt bifurcated findings in its habitual-offender cases in
the early 1800s.
As for the policy reason that initially led to the
alternative charging practice from which the exception
grew, that reason has vanished. Identification occurs
in plenty of time to include in the initial charging
instrument those prior convictions that actually raise
the sentence range. State and local law enforcement has
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been submitting and retrieving fingerprints electronically
from the FBI for about 15 years. The largest biometric
database in the world, the FBI’s Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), contains
fingerprints and criminal histories for more than 70
million people and reportedly matches fingerprints in an
average of 30 minutes. Criminal history, if it will justify
a longer prison sentence, deserves the same pre-charge
investigation as other facts that may aggravate a crime.

Stare Decisis: Eroded Doctrine,
Shifting Votes
If all of the possible justifications for the priorconviction exception to the Apprendi rule are as weak
as I suggest, the Court is unlikely to decide that stare
decisis warrants keeping it on life support. Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg have already made their opposition to the
exception clear, so its demise would require only
two more votes, from Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor, or Elena Kagan. In Alleyne, Justice Breyer
agreed to overrule as “anomalous” the Court’s decision
(a decision where he had written in support) exempting
from the Apprendi rule facts that raise the minimum
sentence. The exception for prior convictions is equally,
if not more, anomalous, and Justice Breyer may very
well be ready to overrule his prior opinion for the Court
in Almendarez-Torres, too. And the justification that
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan provided in Alleyne is
equally applicable here: When prosecutors are perfectly
able to charge and prove these matters to a jury, Justice
Sotomayor wrote for herself (and Justices Kagan and
Ginsburg), “stare decisis does not compel adherence
to a decision whose ‘underpinnings’ have been ‘eroded’
by subsequent developments of constitutional law.”
If the Court discards the exception, it will finally end
cases like David Appleby’s. Appleby was charged with
third-offense DUI and third-offense driving on a revoked
license. At his plea proceeding, he was informed that his
maximum sentence on each charge was three years, for
six years total. He was not warned that his plea would
actually expose him to life in prison if the prosecutor
decided to file a “recidivist information.” So he pleaded
guilty, and before sentencing, the prosecutor did file a
recidivist information, alleging that Appleby had been
previously convicted of other felonies (namely, one
assault, several felony versions of DUI, and driving on a

revoked license). A jury found Appleby to be the same
person who had been convicted before, and the judge
sentenced him to life in prison. In 2010, a divided panel
of the Fourth Circuit, relying on Almendarez-Torres,
rejected Appleby’s constitutional challenge. But in
dissent, Judge William B. Traxler cut to the heart of the
problem: “Appleby was sentenced to life on the charges
to which he pleaded guilty after being told that he could
be sentenced to no more than six years” (my modified
emphasis). It is time for the Court to require prosecutors
in West Virginia to do what prosecutors elsewhere
seem to have no trouble doing: determine whether the
defendant is eligible for recidivist punishment, decide
whether to pursue that punishment, and give formal
notice of this to the defendant—before conviction.
Prosecutors, courts, and legislatures can’t have it both
ways: If a recidivist premium is indeed punishment for
the crime a defendant admits at his guilty plea and not
additional punishment for the prior convictions that
boost his sentence, then the Constitution requires that
he be informed of the actual sentence range that he
faces if convicted, before he decides whether to admit
or contest the charge.

I do not advocate abandoning using criminal history in
sentencing. But as courts, legislatures, and commissions
revisit how criminal history affects punishment, I hope
that they take the opportunity not only to bring these
rules into compliance with the Constitution but also to
consider whether they make sense given what we have
learned about their effects. For example, if a criminal
history aggravator is supposed to isolate the most violent
offenders for incapacitation, then the prior convictions
that trigger a lengthier sentence should be narrowed
to those that predict violent behavior, and back-end
release provisions should be made available for those
who by anyone’s measure do not pose that risk, such
as the elderly and the very ill. Changes such as these,
bringing sentencing practice into line with theory and
research, may seem incremental, but the potential impact
is significant, not only for those branded as convicted
criminals—figuratively not literally nowadays—but also
for everyone who bears the costs of using incarceration
to control crime.
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